The purpose of this paper is to consider and formalize an important factor of human intelligence, belief affected by passion, which we call narrow-minded belief. Based on Public Announcement Logic, we define our logic, Logic Of Narrow-minded belief (LON), as that which includes such belief. Semantics for LON is provided by the Kripke-style semantics, and a proof system for it is given by the Hilbert-style proof system. We then provide a proof of the semantic completeness theorem for the proof system with the innermost strategy of reducing a formula for LON. Using LON, we formally analyze the mental state of the hero of Shakespeare's tragedy Othello as an example of narrow-minded belief and its formalization.
INTRODUCTION
Love is blind, and hatred is also blind. To generalize these phrases, we may say that passion causes narrow-mindedness. It is not unusual that people cannot emotionally stop believing what they do not want to believe without any specific reason to believe so. The hero of William Shakespeare's play, Othello, is involved in a pitiful but possible situation where he wants to believe his wife's chastity but he cannot since he heard a bad rumor about her. It may be difficult to answer whether or not he believes that his wife is a betrayer of their marriage given that he has heard this rumor. In this situation, Othello has at least two different types of belief and/or knowledge. One is passionate or narrow-minded belief, which he is willing to believe or cannot stop believing emotionally. The other is belief, which is more rational (less passionate) or, without considering any philosophical discussions regarding the relationship between knowledge and belief, it may even be said, is knowledge whereby he judges something based on information attained via rational inferences. The latter type of knowledge or belief is treated by a standard epistemic (or doxastic) logic and the current researchers would like to introduce the former belief, passionate belief or narrowminded belief.
In fact, the notion of passion has a philosophically and psychologically profound meaning in terms of belief, and it is highly possible that such emotional belief plays a significant role in rationality. In A Treatise of Human Nature, Hume famously (or even notoriously) wrote the following quotation.
[T]he principle, which opposes our passion, cannot be the same with reason, and is only called so in an improper sense. We speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions [...] . (Hume, 1739, Book II, Sec. 3, Part 3) .
Here, Hume says not only that passion has the same significance as rationality, but also that reason is a subordinate of passion. We introduce one more quotation from modern literature, Damasio' s Descartes' error, to support the importance of consideration on the relationship between passion and rationality.
[T]here may be a connecting trail, in anatomical and functional terms, from reason to feelings to body. It is as if we are possessed by a passion for reason [...] . Reason, from the practical to the theoretical, is probably constructed on this inherent drive by a process which resembles the mastering of a skill or craft. Remove the drive, and you will not acquire the mastery. But having the drive does not automatically make you a master. (Damasio, 1994, Part III, Chap. 11) By referring neurological evidence, Damasio argues that feeling (or passion) and rationality are strongly connected with other, and they cannot be separated as Descartes thought. The current researchers would like to take a similar stance to that of Damasio, where passion and rationality (in our term, narrow-minded belief and knowledge) are related to one another in a formal language of epistemic logic.
In this paper, we treat such a paradigm of agent communication that each agent changes his/her belief, after receiving messages from others, to strengthen/ weaken his/her tolerance. Towards this motivation, we present a logic that adequately reflects human minds which tends to be biased by certain kinds of information.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we introduce logic of narrow-minded belief (LON) which is based on Public Announcement Logic by Plaza (Plaza, 1989 ) and refers to the ideas of explicit and implicit belief in dynamic epistemic awareness logic by van Benthem & Velázquez-Quesada (van Benthem and Velázquez-Quesada, 2010) . Its semantics are given by an expansion of the Kripke-style semantics. In Section 3, we attempt to investigate and formalize a person's belief and emotion through focusing on a literary work, Othello since this is a story of delicate transition of the hero's narrow-minded belief towards his wife. In Section 4, we introduce a Hilbert-style proof system LON of LON, and some proof theoretic properties. In Section 5, we give a proof of the semantic completeness of our proof system LON (Theorem 5.4) through the innermost strategy for reducing a formula for LON into a formula without announcement operators. In Section 6, we introduce related epistemic/doxastic logics to the present work.
LANGUAGE AND SEMANTICS OF LON

Language
First of all, we address the syntax of LON. Let Atom = {p, q, . . .} be a countable set of atomic propositions. Then, formula ϕ of the language L (KN ⊕!) is inductively defined as follows (p ∈ Atom): 
where the notations M ϕ , M ⊕ϕ and M !ϕ above respectively indicate the en-models defined by
Then we define the validity of a formula in a usual way. We confirm that an en-model, which is modified by announcement operators [⊕ϕ], [ ϕ] and [.!.ϕ], preserves frame properties, i.e., R is an equivalence relation and the subset relation Q ⊆ R.
Proposition 2.1 (Preserving frame properties). Let
also en-models.
Proof. What we wish to show is that (1) R !ϕ is an equivalence relation (i.e., it satisfies reflexivity, Euclidicity and transitivity), and (2) the subset relation Q !ϕ ⊆ R !ϕ , (3) the subset relation Q ϕ ⊆ R and (4) the subset relation Q ⊕ϕ ⊆ R. We only treat one of (1) and (3) in the following.
(
Since R is Euclidean i.e., xRy and xRz jointly imply yRz for all x, y, z ∈ S. By the assumption
EXAMPLES OF FORMALIZATION OF NARROW-MINDED BELIEF
Comments of Knowledge and Narrow-minded Belief Operators
Before moving on the topic of narrow-minded belief, we add some comments on the general features of knowledge operator K and accessibility relation R in epistemic logics. Let us look at the epistemic model
and the graphic form of this model is as follows.
In this model, at world w, the agent is ignorant about p's truth-value. This is because the formula Kp ∧ K¬p, which intuitively means that the agent does not know whether p, is true at w. As it implies, in epistemic logic, an arrow between states has a negative meaning in general. In other words, van Ditmarsch et al. state that "the more worlds an agent considers possible, the less he believes, and vice versa." (van Ditmarsch et al., 2008, p.55) . The operator K represents at least one arrow in an epistemic model. The narrow-minded belief operator N basically preserves these features; nevertheless, we cannot say that 'the more worlds an agent considers possible, the less he believes, and vice versa' in case of the operator N since the narrow-mind belief is affected by uncertain information or even the agent's imagination and may be wrong. In other words, to express such capricious belief, we introduce the operator N.
Additionally, we note on the frame property of R and Q. The accessibility relation R represents the accessibility relation for knowledge, and so we assume that the agent is an introspective agent, i.e., R is an equivalence relation. Moreover, the formulas of Kϕ → ϕ, Kϕ → KKϕ (positive introspection) and ¬Kϕ → K¬Kϕ (negative introspection) are valid at M where its accessibility relation is equivalence relation. However, since Q represents a narrowminded belief, we do not assume the agent is introspective since introspectiveness is based on some kind of rationality, which is the exact opposite of narrowmindedness. That is why Q does not have any frame property. By distinguishing these two accessibility relations, we formally express the distinction between knowledge and narrow-minded belief.
Formalizing Othello's Narrow-minded Belief
As mentioned in the introduction, our target, which we consider and formalize, Othello's mind, including narrow-minded belief in each of the four scenes, may be semantically modeled as follows. We note that, in the graphic form of enmodels, the double circle indicates the actual state. In addition, arrows of the straight line represent the line of R and arrows of the dotted line represent that of Q. Moreover, let an atomic proposition p to read 'Desdemona is having an affair,' and Atom = {p}.
(1) Othello deeply believes his wife. In the initial stage, Othello, who was recently married, believes his wife from the depth of his heart and does not doubt her immorality. However, Othello does not have any specific evidence that Desdemona is having an affair and he does not actually know if she is innocent or not at this stage. Therefore, the initial stage already includes some contradiction in his mind, i.e., he does not explicitly know if she is innocent, but he narrow-mindedly believes her. Thus, the mental state of Othello at the opening of the play may for- (3) Iago uses fake evidence to convince Othello of Desdemona's immorality. At this stage of the play, Iago attempts to deceive his superior, Othello, by using fake evidence (Desdemona's handkerchief) to pretend she spent her time with Cassio, and Othello is completely taken in. Consequently, Othello completely loses his self-control, and strongly and narrow-mindedly believes that his wife is having an affair with Cassio. This is also rep- the case of the operator N, it does not mean that if the number of arrows is reduced, then the agent's ignorance is reduced.
(4) A servant truthfully informs that Desdemona is innocent. In the last scene of the play, Desdemona's faithful servant truthfully tells the fact that Desdemona is innocent, implying that Othello's narrow-minded belief regarding his wife is completely erroneous. Othello faces such a surprising fact and he is heart-broken by the confession. This is represented by en-model
{s}, {(s, s)}, / 0, / 0} . Formally, by the truthful information of ¬p, a state t where p holds is eliminated, and as a result, while the agent (Othello) knows ¬p (his wife is innocent), the arrow of narrowminded belief is empty. This means that he narrowmindedly believes everything even if it is a contradiction M p⊕p!¬p |= ⊥, i.e., he is going crazy. As a result, the tragedy ends with the suicide of Othello in the final scene. 
HILBERT-SYSTEM FOR LON
We move on the topic of a proof theory for LON. Hilbert-system for LON (LON), is defined in Table 1. Axioms (4) and (5) indicate what we call positive introspection and negative introspection, respectively. Axiom (K&N) indicates a relation of knowledge and narrow-mined belief, in which if the agent knows something, he/she also narrow-mindedly believes. This implies that narrow-minded belief is one of the bases of our knowledge, and this view of belief and knowledge can be supported by philosophers and/or psychologists like Hume and Damasio, as discussed in the introduction. Axioms (RA * ) are called reduction axioms. Through the reduction axioms and rules, each theorem of LON may be reduced into a theorem of the language L (KN) which will be shown in Section 5.
We provide some basic definitions and properties for proofs in the next section. Let ϕ be a formula of L (KN ⊕!) and Γ be a subset of languageKakko. Then, ϕ is derivable from Γ (Γ LON ϕ) if there exists a finite subset Γ of Γ such that LON Γ → ϕ.
Proposition 4.1. Let ϕ, χ, ψ be arbitrary formulas of L (KN ⊕!) . Then the following holds. Axioms for knowledge andnarrow−minded belief (taut) all instantiations of propositional tautologies
replaced by χ, and defined as follows:
where • ∈ {¬, K, N} and * ∈ { , ⊕, !}. 
COMPLETENESS
Let us move onto a proof of the completeness theorem of LON with a similar argument in (van Ditmarsch et al., 2008, Section 5) . Proof. Fix any ϕ ∈ L (KN) such that ϕ is derivable in LON . We show that ϕ is valid by induction on the height of the derivation. In the base case, the derivation height is 0 i.e., it consists of only an axiom. Therefore, we show the validity of each axiom of LON.
Semantic Completeness of LON
A direct proof of the completeness theorem of LON can be shown in a usual manner with Lindenbaum's lemma.
Theorem 5.2 (Completeness for LON w.r.t. the semantics of L (KN) ). For any ϕ ∈ L (KN) , the following holds:
|= ϕ implies LON ϕ.
Based on the completeness theorem of LON , we expand the discussion to the completeness of LON. A proof of the completeness theorem of LON is given in this section by the reduction method whose basic idea was introduced in the previous work (Plaza, 1989 , Theorem 2.7). The essential idea of this method is based on the fact that every formula in L (KN ⊕!) is reducible into a formula in L (KN) which will be shown in Lemma 5.3. Remark 5.1. We note that reduction axioms for sequential announcement operators e.g.,
are not included since, without them, any formula with announcement operators can be reducible. It is known that there are at least two strategies to reduce a formula with announcement operators into a formula without any such operator. Let us consider the formula [!p][!q]r − (i). One approach, we may call it 'outermost strategy', focuses on the outermost occurrence of announcement operator, for example [!p] of the above formula (i). Following this strategy, an axiom like (RA!6) is required for reducing the formula. By using (RA!6), we may obtain [!(p∧[!p]q)]q. Then (RA!1) becomes applicable, and so we obtain the formula which does not include any announcement operator but is equivalent to the initial formula. This approach is introduced by (van Ditmarsch et al., 2008) . The other strategy may be called 'innermost strategy' and focuses on the innermost occurrence of announcement operator, for example [!q] of (i). Thus, by applying (RA!1) to the innermost occurrence i.e., [!q]r, we obtain [!p](q → r). After that, (RA!3) and (RA!1) are subsequently applicable, and so we obtain the formula without any announcement operator but equivalent to the initial formula of (i). The latter strategy does not require reduction axioms for reducing sequential announcement operators into a single. Therefore, we employ this strategy to avoid introducing many and messy axioms. by using the innermost strategy is given in (Aucher, 2003, Proposition 3.3.5). 2 At first, we treat the soundness theorem of it which is straightforward. Next, we give some definitions and lemmas for proof of the completeness. With these settings, we may show the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Let * be ⊕, or !. Then for all reduction
Proof. We only confirm the following case.
Case of (RA 5). The less-than relation
Nϕ) holds by the following equations:
Then we can prove that ([ ψ]Nϕ) = k 1+ (ϕ) > 8 + 2 · (ϕ) + 3 · k (ϕ) (where k = (5 + (ψ)) ≥ 6) holds. 3 2 We add one more comment for a technical difference between the two strategies. In the outermost strategy of public announcement logic, we need to include axiom like (RA!6) to reduce sequential announcement operators into a single, but the inference rule of (Nec[!]) is derivable. On the other hand, the rule is indispensable in the case of the innermost strategy, instead of economizing the number of axioms.
3 Let (ϕ) = n and f n (k) ≡ k n+1 − 3k n − 2n − 8. Then obviously f n (k) = k n (k − 3) − 2n − 8 > 0 for k ≥ 6 for any fixed n ≥ 1, as well as for fixed n ≥ 1 for any k ≥ 6. Proof. Fix any p ∈ Atom and ϕ, χ ∈ L (KN ⊕!) . Then assume (ϕ) > (χ). We conduct the proof by induc- Other cases are similar to the above. Proof. By induction on (ϕ). We only treat the following case. Actually, Lemma 5.3 is the core of the proof of the completeness theorem. Through this, we may easily show the theorem as follows. 
RELATED WORKS
In this section, we introduce some related epistemic/doxastic logics. An epistemic logic for implicit and explicit belief by (Velázquez-Quesada, 2014) is perhaps the closest concept we can find to that of LON. This logic is based on the logic of awareness logic (van Benthem and Velázquez-Quesada, 2010), and it distinguishes the sense of belief into two, implicit and explicit belief, to avoid the logical omniscience in epistemic logic. A traditional approach to mix knowledge and belief operators, sometimes called epistemic-doxastic logic (e.g., see (Voorbraak, 1993) ), is another system similar to ours since K and N of LON may be interpreted as a mixture of these two different human tendencies.
One of differences between LON and the above existing works may relate to the definition of the satisfaction relation of LON:
Here, we include a mechanism of adding arrows i.e., a mechanism in which some of the information may confuse the agent.
In addition, there are some other attempts to introduce a distinction in our belief/knowledge from a different point of view. Intuitionistic epistemic logic (Artemov and Protopopescu, 2014; Williamson, 1992 ) is one of them; this epistemic logic is based on intuitionistic logic, which distinguishes knowledge into two: standard knowledge, which normal epistemic logics treat and knowledge in the strict sense. In other words, this aims at introducing a distinction in knowledge, more strict and rational knowledge and not strict knowledge, which is an opposite perspective to our attempt, which introduced a distinction between belief with passion and knowledge.
There are also some logics which deal with human emotion; for example (Lorini and Schwarzentruber, 2011) and (Dastani and Lorini, 2012) . We may, for the further development, need to consider relevance to these existing logics about emotion.
CONCLUSION AND FURTHER DIRECTIONS
We introduced logic of narrow-minded belief (LON), a variant of dynamic epistemic logic. This aims to formally express a human's passionate and narrowminded belief, and as an example of the application of LON, we formalized Shakespeare's play Othello.
Philosophers and neuropsychologists believe that passion, or belief affected by passion, is an indispensable factor and even a basis for our reason. Without passion or emotions, human intelligence may be never realized. Therefore, we hope that our attempt in the present work will contribute to formal expressions of the human mind. It may be possible to further develop our attempt in various directions. For example, we did not regard the problem of the logical omniscience; the logic of awareness is one of the candidates to be added to LON, as it is difficult to interpret the meaning of awareness in the context of passion. Another interesting feature that should be considered and added to LON is 'a lie' as it pertains to dynamic epistemic logic by van Ditmarsch (van Ditmarsch, 2011). Actually, Iago's rumor should be regarded as a lie, as our passion or narrow-mindedness is easily affected by such dubious information. Therefore, it might be interesting to consider these aspects in future researches regarding the logic of passion.
